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ABSTRACT 
“Lawfare” is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military adversary. Lawfare 
critics complain that self-proclaimed “humanitarians” are really engaged in the partisan 
and political abuse of law—lawfare. This paper turns the mirror on lawfare critics 
themselves, and argues that the critique of lawfare is no less abusive and political than 
the alleged lawfare it attacks. Radical lawfare critics view humanitarian law with 
suspicion, as nothing more than an instrument used by weak adversaries against strong 
military powers. Casting suspicion on humanitarian law by attacking the motives of 
humanitarian lawyers, they undermine disinterested argument, and ultimately undermine 
the validity of their own critique. 
 The paper then explores the vision of politics and law underlying the lawfare 
critique through a reading of the most significant theorist who defends that vision, the 
German theorist Carl Schmitt. Through a reading and critique of Schmitt, the article 
examines both the force of the lawfare critique and its flaws. 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Lawfare” is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military adversary. Law 
can be weaponized in many ways, but easiest is accusing the adversary of war crimes, 
thereby subjecting him to harassment through litigation and bad publicity. War crimes 
accusations are not the only method of lawfare, of course. The U.S. government lawyers 
who wrote the torture memos, contriving legal arguments to legitimize Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) torture, were engaged in lawfare of a different sort; indeed, 
John Yoo, the best-known of these lawyers, indirectly boasted about lawfare by titling his 
memoir War By Other Means,1 an ingenious twist on the Clausewitizian dictum that war 
is politics by other means.  In his view, apparently, the law he practiced in his 
government service was war by other means, which is simply another name for lawfare. 
In other contexts as well, states can wage lawfare just as non-state actors can. Major 
General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., who popularized the term “lawfare,” points out that 
lawfare “can operate as a positive ‘good,’” and details several examples in which the 
United States has “substitut[ed] lawfare methodologies for traditional material means.”2  
My chief example of lawfare, though, will be accusations by non-state actors of war 
crimes by a powerful, modern army. That is surely what today’s shouting is about. 
                                                 

  University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1
 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). 
2
 Charles J. Dunlap, Commentary, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 146, 146–47 
(2008). 
 2 
Although the term “lawfare” can be used purely descriptively, as General Dunlap 
does, it usually is not.3 “Lawfare” is a pejorative and polemical word. To accuse someone 
of lawfare is to accuse them of something sneaky. There are two pieces to the accusation. 
First is the insinuation that those who wage lawfare are fighting by cowardly means. That 
was the implication of a much-remarked sentence from the National Defense Strategy of 
the United States in 2002 and 2005: “Our strength as a nation state will continue to be 
challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial 
processes, and terrorism.”4 Lumping judicial processes together with terrorism as part of 
a “strategy” is equivalent to accusing those who take the United States government to 
court with lawfare of a particularly vile sort, and labeling lawfare “a strategy of the 
weak” is a taunt. Why doesn’t the enemy just come out and fight like real men, instead of 
pretending to be disinterested adherents to legality?  
Second, the lawfare accusation implicitly assumes that “lawriors”—as I shall call 
those who engage in lawfare—are abusing the law by making unfounded accusations of 
illegality against their enemies. The lawrior poses as a disinterested legal actor who, more 
in sorrow than in anger, calls the world’s attention to war crimes by a party who, just by 
coincidence, happens to be the adversary. Such accusations are factually or legally 
baseless. So lawfare is a double affront, against both martial virtue and legal virtue. 
 Let me say a bit more about why lawfare offends against legal virtue. Lawfare is a 
species of the politicization of law. Legitimate legal claims appeal to standards that 
transcend the particular case and the particular parties. Legal claims are never supposed 
to be demands backed by nothing but the will of the parties—”give it to me because I 
want it!”—but rather demands backed by claims under neutral standards, taking the form 
“give it to me because I have a legal right to it!” Of course we are entitled to skepticism 
about the political neutrality of the law at all levels: legislation, access to legal 
institutions, judicial interpretation, and application of law to facts. But law can and does 
hold out the promise of at least relative neutrality and relative depoliticization—
compared with partisan mud-slinging, dirty tricks, and armed conflict; and it is hard to 
see how law could fool so many people so much of the time if it never delivered on the 
promise. 
 The lawfare critic accuses the enemy lawrior of politicizing law, presumably for 
base reasons. Specifically, the lawfare critic accuses the enemy lawrior of abusing 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law to hamstring or at least 
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harass enemy military planners.5 The past decade has seen two major eruptions of the 
lawfare critique.6 The first was by the United States during the Bush Administration, and 
the second was by Israel and American supporters of Israel in the wake of the Goldstone 
Report. In the first case, the accusations were that the governments of “old Europe” and 
nongovernmental organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) aimed to undermine U.S. tactics in the War on Terror for essentially political 
motives.7 Here, the accusation of lawfare was indirect: no one accused the ICRC or 
western Europeans of intentionally aiding al-Qaeda, although some lawfare critics 
insinuated that the Europeans might have a geopolitical agenda of hobbling U.S. military 
dominance.8 Rather, the accusation was that the humanitarian groups are the jihadis’ 
useful idiots. The reaction to the Goldstone Report was different: here, the accusation 
was, in the words of journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, that Richard Goldstone was “the chief of 
the hanging party” whose “mandate . . . was to find Israel guilty.”9 This is a more direct 
accusation of intentional and deliberate lawfare than in the American debate. 
 Just as the accusation of lawfare is a species of the broader accusation of 
politicizing law—specifically, that lawriors politicize law for someone’s military 
advantage—it is also a species of ad hominem argument. By unmasking the recourse to 
humanitarian law as lawfare on behalf of an interested party’s military goals, lawfare 
critics deflects attention from the substance of the legal claims to the self-interest and 
sneaky motives of the person entering them. Like all ad hominem arguments, the lawfare 
critique has the rhetorical function of diverting attention from what classical rhetoric 
called the logos of an argument—its substance—to its ethos—the character of the 
speaker.10 The logos in this case is the argument that soldiers have committed war 
crimes; the ethos is the insidious and militarized motives of making those accusations.  
 Of course, ad hominem criticism is itself the primary technique of politicized 
argument. Lawfare critics are themselves engaged in lawfare. Not that critiques of 
lawfare are necessarily a form of lawfare, just as not all war crimes accusations are a 
form of lawfare. Sometimes an argument is just an argument. But the most conspicuous 
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lawfare critics are suspicious of the claims of self-proclaimed humanitarian and human 
rights lawyers to be disinterested. Engaged in mortal combat against the lawriors, lawfare 
critics have no more use for disinterested inquiry than does a soldier on a battlefield.11  
 Some issues seem to lend themselves to politicized academic treatment because 
they tap into high-stakes public controversies, however indirectly. Some years ago, I was 
working on a law-and-literature paper about the trial scene in Aeschylus’s Oresteia, and 
my research led to questions about whether there has ever been a historical matriarchy.12 
One famous 1861 interpretation of the Oresteia maintains that its legend derives from an 
actual conquest of a matriarchal Greek society by patriarchal Dorian invaders.13 Frederick 
Engels accepted this interpretation in The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and 
the State, and as a result it became official dogma in the Communist world.14 I discovered 
that it was virtually impossible to find classicists on either side of the question of 
historical matriarchy who were not caught up in Cold War polemics. It was difficult for 
an outsider to the debate, such as myself, who had no dog in the fight, to find scholarship 
that did not smell unreliable.15 Apparently, the Cold War sucked even an obscure 
question of anthropology and archaeology into a political vortex, and pulled the scholars 
in with it. Another example is the tiresome and endless debate about punitive damages 
and alleged American litigiousness and runaway juries. Some years ago I attended an 
academic conference on punitive damages with a distinguished speaker-list that was quite 
balanced between the “pros,” the “antis,” and the “empiricists” who actually had data 
about the incidence of punitive damages. The morning the conference began, its 
dismayed organizer announced that the pro-business, anti-punitive damages speakers had 
pulled out. It seems that the general counsel of a major insurance company had read the 
papers in draft and concluded that the empirical studies were too damning to the anti-
punitive damages side. Therefore the conference must be delegitimized by appearing to 
be one-sided business bashing. She organized corporate clients to instruct their counsel 
on the speaker’s program to pull out of the conference. The conference organizer was 
flabbergasted. As I recall, only one pro-business speaker remained. Today’s lawfare 
debate has many of the earmarks of these other debates: the scholarship always contains 
veiled polemical subtext that outsiders to the debate can sense even if they cannot decode 
it.16 Ultimately, readers who honestly want to form an opinion and who come to the 
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scholarship for insight rather than validation of prior political positions will be 
disappointed. They will conclude, as I did reading the “historical matriarchy” literature, 
that hardly any of it is trustworthy. Not only are the legal issues politicized, but the 
academic debates about them are as well. 
 The lawfare critique is not simply that those accusing states of war crimes have 
ulterior motives, which would not be an interesting charge. Of course they have ulterior 
motives. Anyone who voluntarily has recourse to the institutions of the law has ulterior 
motives: nobody ever files a lawsuit out of disinterested curiosity in the answer to a legal 
question. In everyday litigation, we hardly think it noteworthy or morally condemnable to 
learn that a plaintiff has a self-interested motive for the suit; if she didn’t, we might in 
fact deny her standing. Undoubtedly, the ICRC has its own institutional interest in 
defending its interpretation of international humanitarian law. Undoubtedly, Hamas had 
ulterior motives in steering the Goldstone Commission to some witnesses rather than 
others, just as Israel had ulterior motives in hampering Goldstone’s investigation. Any 
competent lawyer has strategic reasons behind her choice of which legal arguments she 
will advance, when she will advance them, and in which forum. If strategic, goal-oriented 
planning behind legal arguments is the hallmark of lawfare, all litigation is like lawfare. 
The only difference is the specific military nature of the goal, that is, that legal success 
will constrain a state’s military forces by declaring some of their tactics legally off-limits. 
The real issue, as in domestic litigation, is not whether parties have ulterior motives, but 
whether the ulterior motives can be backed with valid legal arguments—whether logos 
underlies ethos and pathos. To insinuate that advancing such arguments is lawfare, and 
hence illegitimate, is to insinuate that law should never constrain armed might. Thus the 
radical critique of lawfare amounts to an assault on international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law as such. 
II. Carl Schmitt as Lawfare Critic 
 I am interested in the intellectual genealogy of the lawfare critique. Is there a 
coherent philosophy behind the mistrust of humanitarian law as a tool or pretext for 
disarming a state’s military? In my view, such a philosophy exists in one of the most 
significant and famous works of political theory of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt’s 
1932 essay The Concept of the Political.17 Schmitt was a conservative jurist and 
philosopher during the Weimar Republic. He fell into eclipse after World War II because 
he had been a legal publicist for the Nazi Party, and had published some anti-Semitic 
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writings.18 In the 1970s, Schmitt went through a curious revival by theorists on the left, 
and, after 9/11, interest in him ratcheted up again, largely because of his writings that 
support untrammeled executive power in the face of emergency.19 Many writers noticed 
the “Schmittian” character of the Bush Administration’s constitutional arguments, and 
political theorist and commentator Alan Wolfe included in his 2009 book The Future of 
Liberalism a chapter bearing the wonderful title “Mr. Schmitt Goes to Washington.”20 
Schmitt lived well into his 90s and was able to witness his own rehabilitation and indeed 
his ultimate recognition as a major political thinker. And, like it or not, Schmitt is a major 
political thinker, as well as a powerfully seductive and stimulating writer. 
 The fundamental proposition of The Concept of the Political is that properly 
understood, “the political” refers solely to the friend-enemy distinction.21 Furthermore, 
“[t]he friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential 
sense, not as metaphors or symbols,”22 and “[t]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts 
receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical 
killing.”23 Schmitt does not mean that politics always involves physical warfare: “War is 
neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever 
present possibility, it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic 
way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior.”24 
Schmitt also insists that “[t]he enemy in the political sense need not be hated 
personally”; but that is irrelevant to whether we will kill him if necessary.25 We fight not 
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out of personal hatred but because the enemy threatens our way of life. “If such physical 
destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of 
life, then it cannot be justified. Just as little can war be justified by ethical and juristic 
norms.”26 The fallacy of liberalism for Schmitt lies in the thought that man is intrinsically 
good, so if we eradicate hatred we can eradicate enmity and killing. On the contrary, “all 
genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic 
but a dangerous and dynamic being.”27 
It follows from Schmitt’s fundamental friend-enemy conception of politics that all 
political groupings are oppositional—no enemies, no politics. The political world is by 
definition a world of us and them, and a political community “which embraces the entire 
globe and all of humanity cannot exist.”28 The ancient ideal of a cosmopolis, a 
community of all humanity, is an apolitical fiction, and the fact that one of them, the 
enemy, is just as human, just as decent, and just as lovable as one of us provides no 
argument against killing him. 
Of course people will continue to invoke the ideals of “humanity.” But in 
Schmitt’s view, anyone who does so operates in bad faith. As he puts it in the most 
memorable line in this very memorable book, “whoever invokes humanity wants to 
cheat.”29 Not that there is anything wrong with cheating—that’s politics:  
That wars are waged in the name of humanity . . . has an especially 
intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the 
name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war 
wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its 
military opponent30 
Humanitarianism is, in Schmitt’s view, extraordinarily dangerous. Fighting on behalf of 
“humanity” makes your enemy “an outlaw of humanity” and allows you to do the most 
terrible things to him.31 A war to end all war—”the absolute last war of humanity”—is 
“necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because . . . it simultaneously degrades the 
enemy into . . . a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.”32 
And the word “humanity” is not the only polemical, political term masquerading 
as a lofty moral concept.  “There are always concrete human groupings which fight other 
concrete human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, or peace. When being 
reproached for immorality and cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always 
recognize in such reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat.”33 
“The political” is not a philosophical idea or indeed an idea of any sort: it is a 
concrete, existential reality. Political concepts have only polemical meanings. They may 
sound philosophical or universal, but in truth “[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict 
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and are bound to a concrete situation; . . . and they turn into empty and ghostlike 
abstractions when this situation disappears.”34 Strictly speaking, then, Schmitt denies the 
very possibility of political philosophy. There are only political jabs and thrusts disguised 
as philosophy. 
 For Schmitt, indeed, the category of the political devours all other categories, not 
merely political philosophy. There is no escaping politics into a disinterested realm of 
any sort. 
Above all the polemical character determines the use of the word political 
regardless of whether the adversary is designated as nonpolitical (in the sense of 
harmless), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce him as political in 
order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of purely scientific, purely 
moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of similar 
purities) and thereby superior.35 
We can understand Schmitt’s point through a contemporary example: debates over 
climate change or the theory of evolution. Some people think that whether man-made 
greenhouse gasses cause dangerous climate change is a scientific question; so is the 
question of whether human beings evolved from nonhuman ancestors. But those who 
think that on scientific issues we should defer to science fail to understand that the 
concept of the political devours science along with everything else. If scientific 
conclusions would imply that we must change our way of life, we will reject the 
conclusions and, if necessary, destroy the scientists. If the scientists complain that attacks 
on their character, integrity, or honesty are “political,” we will (for political reasons) 
denounce their response as merely political.  
That is what Schmitt means by saying that “the polemical character determines 
the use of the word political.” Even the word political is political: we use it to smear and 
undermine the claims of our adversaries. “Terminological questions become . . . highly 
political.”36 Then, after denouncing the scientists’ defense of themselves as political, we 
will continue to slime them, and try as hard as we can to get them fired, defunded, and 
silenced. They may have thought they were answering a scientific, technical question. 
But in the world of politics there are no technical questions, only political questions. 
Hobbes recognized this when he wrote:  
I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to 
the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle, 
should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not 
disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he 
whom it concerned was able.37  
Of course Schmitt does not deny that that science, or art, or law, or geometry can be 
apolitical, provided political bodies find them harmless to their way of life; even more so 
if they find them useful in political conflicts. There is no denying that a state can 
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sometimes gain political advantage by promoting a flourishing cultural scene. But politics 
remains primary in the sense that it is up to political actors to decide when an artist or 
scientist becomes politically dangerous; if they do, there will be no such thing as art for 
art’s sake or science for the sake of knowledge. The scientists’ protests of apolitical 
innocence will be condemned as an especially crafty political ruse. 
Notice that in the paragraph quoted above Schmitt includes the “purely juristic” as 
one of the polemical stances enemies can take when they pretend to be nonpolitical—as a 
way to be political. The ICRC claims it is making impartial, “purely juristic” arguments 
about the laws of war.38 Lawfare critics recognize that ICRC’s claim to be purely juristic 
and nonpolitical is simply an insidious way of being political, of waging lawfare against 
states with powerful armies. The ICRC pretends to be neutral—one of the tell-tale signs 
by which we recognize the enemy. In one of most significant sentences in his book, 
Schmitt writes: “The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the 
enemy is, in concrete reality, recognized as the enemy.”39 The lawfare critique is, in 
Schmitt’s sense, a high point of politics. 
 Schmitt denounces all “neutralizations and depoliticizations,”40 which for him are 
the hallmarks of liberalism. There are no neutralizations: if you are not with us you are 
against us and we will destroy you: “If a part of the population declares that it no longer 
recognizes enemies, then, depending on the circumstance, it joins their side and aids 
them.”41 You may not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you. 
 Is there any escape from the all-consuming quicksand of politics? Not according 
to Schmitt: “If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the 
sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people 
will disappear.”42 To retreat from politics invites annihilation; to yearn for a respite from 
politics is to yearn for death. 
 One additional idea, not very apparent in The Concept of the Political, comes out 
in some of Schmitt’s later works, particularly his 1962 lectures on what we would today 
call terrorism, The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of 
the Political, and his 1950 book on international law, The Nomos of the Earth. It would 
be a mistake to think that Schmitt rejects the idea of laws governing warfare, or, for that 
matter, that he idealizes war and rejects humanitarian restraint. Rather, he believes that 
the ability to “bracket” war—to limit it according to the jus in bello principles of non-
combatant immunity and avoidance of unnecessary suffering—is a historically contingent 
achievement of European public law, restricted to sovereigns who treat war as akin to a 
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duel among gentlemen. The jus publicum Europaeanum collapsed through the rise of 
America, the advent of air-power that detaches warfare from territory, and non-state 
warriors who ruthlessly wage absolute war. With it collapsed the possibility of 
“bracketed” warfare. 
At this point, all the pieces of the argument are in place. A world divided into friends 
and enemies locked in existential struggle with real, non-metaphorical killing as the 
permanent backdrop. A critique of “humanitarianism” as a political ruse. A contempt of 
liberals for their weakness and their failure to recognize death struggle as man’s fate. A 
thoroughgoing skepticism about neutral, apolitical arguments of any sort, including legal 
arguments. An insistence that even those who think they can transcend politics into a 
more neutral, objective realm of science, law, economics, or philosophy are aiding the 
enemy and can be treated as enemies. An insistence that laws of armed conflict, 
particularly laws protecting non-combatants, depend on reciprocity among states 
belonging to the classical order of European public law, and that war against terrorists 
can never be bracketed. Schmitt has invented the critique of lawfare. 
III. Schmitt, Strauss, and the Question of Influence 
 Did Carl Schmitt actually exert any influence on contemporary lawfare critics? I 
do not know the answer—you would have to ask them. On its face, the proposition seems 
unlikely: Schmitt was barely discussed outside academic circles, or even much discussed 
within academic circles, until the middle of the millenial decade. The current edition of 
The Concept of the Political appeared in 2007; his influential Political Theology was out 
of print in English for a decade before its 2006 reprint; and the English translations of 
most of Schmitt’s other books appeared after 2005.43 A Lexis search reveals five law 
review references to Schmitt between 1980 and 1990; 114 between 1990 and 2000; and 
420 since 2000, with almost twice as many in the last five years as the previous five. 
One possible connection, noted in 2005 by Scott Horton, is through Leo Strauss.44 
Strauss’s youthful essay on The Concept of the Political is included in the book’s English 
translation.45 Strauss applauded Schmitt’s critique of liberalism enthusiastically, and his 
only criticisms of Schmitt were that Schmitt masked the extent of his nausea (Strauss’s 
word) over pacifism and liberalism, and refrained from following his own argument to 
the inevitable conclusion that humanitarian ideals are not merely unrealistic, but are 
actually immoral and must be combated.46 Strauss’s essay demanded a less kind, less 
gentle Schmitt—one might say that Strauss’s essay is Schmitt without a humanitarian 
face. Strauss, unlike Schmitt, has exerted a powerful and lasting influence on American 
politics, in no small part because so many Straussians have occupied positions in 
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government, journalism, and the neoconservative movement.47 Neoconservatives have 
been among the most vigorous lawfare critics. 
 But I am not arguing for a causal influence of Schmitt on lawfare critics, because 
I cannot demonstrate that it is there. Rather, I am arguing that Schmitt’s philosophy offers 
the best articulation I have found of the lawfare critique. It may be time for lawfare critics 
to take ownership of their ancestor. 
IV. Schmitt’s Misrepresentation of Politics 
 What can be said in response to Schmitt?48 A full-fledged assessment of Schmitt’s 
views lies beyond my aim in this short paper. But I would like to raise some points that 
bear specifically on the lawfare debate. 
 Start with Schmitt’s insistence that the term “political” is itself polemical.49 This 
amounts to a hidden, self-referential caution to readers that Schmitt’s own concept of the 
political is polemical. It is not neutral, objective, academic, or philosophical. It is slanted, 
biased, and loaded. Schmitt tells us that much, but he never holds the mirror to himself 
and tell us exactly how his concept is loaded. 
 My answer is that even though “that’s just political!” is often an accusation, the 
word “political” has positive associations in our tradition, which Schmitt cunningly trades 
on. Aristotle proclaimed that man is the zoôn politikon, the political animal, and argued 
that the political life is the best and freest life for man as a practical being.50 It would 
seem to follow, then, that pacifists or humanitarians who yearn for the end of bloody 
friend-enemy polarities want to destroy something essential to human beings. At several 
points in The Concept of the Political, duly noted by Strauss, Schmitt hints, without 
actually saying, that even if it were possible to expunge deadly friend-enemy dyads from 
the world it would not be desirable. It would shrink the meaningfulness of human life to 
mere entertainment; life would at most be interesting, but never meaningful.51 Strauss 
seizes on these hints that a depoliticized world would be a sub-human world and insists 
that this is Schmitt’s actual view.52 
 We hear in Strauss echoes of Nietzsche’s contempt for “the last man,” the post-
dangerous man, the timid bourgeois—about whom Schmitt too speaks with contempt.53 
Without politics, man would not be man. He would be a tamed puppy. Schmitt does not 
quite say this, but he hints at it: “Were this entity [the friend-enemy grouping] to 
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disappear, . . . then the political itself would disappear.”54 That sounds pretty scary if you 
have positive Aristotelian associations with politics, but in fact, Schmitt’s assertion is a 
mere tautology. He has defined the concept of the political as the friend-enemy grouping, 
so by definition if the friend-enemy grouping disappears the political disappears. So 
what? The only thing that makes this assertion sound significant is the set of 
associations—absent from Schmitt’s friend-enemy construct—that makes us think the 
political is a form of community rather than antipathy, and therefore that the political is 
indispensible to meaningful human life. 
Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very 
foundation of Aristotle’s conception of politics, which Schmitt completely ignores. 
Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the medium for organizing all human 
cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil institutions, and elemental tasks such as 
collecting the garbage and delivering food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of 
course, peering into the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as 
the town mayor’s office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position and 
patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as “banal forms of politics, . 
. . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and intrigues” and dismisses them 
contemptuously as “parasite- and caricature-like formations.”55 The fact is that Schmitt 
has nothing whatever to say about the constructive side of politics, nor about local 
politics; and his entire theory focuses on enemies, not friends. In my small community, 
political meetings debate issues as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic 
to another street. It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such 
disputes, and so, in Schmitt’s view, they would not count as politics, but merely 
administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics. 
 Schmitt, I have said, uses the word “political” polemically—in his sense, 
politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word “political” to describe 
mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity Aristotelian and republican 
associations quite foreign to it. But the more basic point is that Schmitt’s critique of 
humanitarianism as political and polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the 
critique of lawfare is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it 
succeeds in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself. 
 What about the merits of Schmitt’s critique of humanitarianism? His argument is 
straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and apolitical, in which case ruthless 
political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, 
in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on 
behalf of humanity are the most inhuman wars of all.  Liberal humanitarianism is either 
too weak or too savage. 
 The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that wars against 
“outlaws of humanity” would be the most horrible of all, it is hard not to salute him as a 
prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when Schmitt writes about the League of 
Nations’ resolution to use “economic sanctions and severance of the food supply,”56 
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which he calls “imperialism based on pure economic power.”57 Schmitt is no 
warmonger—he calls the killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off 
an existential threat “sinister and crazy”58—nor is he indifferent to human suffering. 
 But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the same thing as 
wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so Schmitt’s important moral 
warning against ultimate military self-righteousness does not really apply.59 Nor does 
“bracketing” war by humanitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished 
order of European public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the 
United States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies who do not 
recognize duties of reciprocity.60 This may frustrate current lawfare critics who complain 
that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being forced to put down their guns. 
Bracketing warfare is a decision—Schmitt might call it an existential decision—that rests 
in part on values that transcend the friend-enemy distinction. Liberal values are not alien 
extrusions into politics or evasions of politics; they are part of politics, and, as Stephen 
Holmes argued against Schmitt, liberalism has proven remarkably strong, not weak.61  
We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that would be a political 
decision.  It would simply be a bad one. 
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